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(66, 67, 70–72) offer no explanation of how or why Tabor became a 
base for Brown and his men. 
 Readers familiar with the recent scholarship on John Brown will 
find in Midnight Rising no great new insights on such familiar topics as 
Brown’s alleged insanity, his Old Testament religious faith, or whether 
or not he was a “proto-terrorist.” What they will find is a highly read-
able narrative of John Brown and the Harpers Ferry raid, with fresh 
insights into the personalities and character of Brown’s family and 




Price’s Lost Campaign: The 1864 Invasion of Missouri, by Mark A. Lause. 
Shades of Blue and Gray Series. Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 2011. vii, 280 pp. Illustrations, maps, appendixes, notes, index. 
$29.95 cloth.  
Reviewer Terry L. Beckenbaugh is assistant professor of military history at the 
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
His dissertation (University of Arkansas, 2001) was “The War of Politics: 
Samuel Ryan Curtis, Race, and the Political/Military Establishment.” 
Mark Lause’s Price’s Lost Campaign: The 1864 Invasion of Missouri is a 
welcome addition to the University of Missouri Press’s Shades of Blue 
and Gray series. Lause’s study is a detailed narrative of the 1864 cam-
paign up to the point that Major General Sterling Price’s rebel Army of 
Missouri turned away from Jefferson City, Missouri. That narrative 
does much to debunk the myths that surround Confederate forces 
during the Civil War, namely that they respected private property and 
eschewed the “Hard War” tactics embraced by the Union army that 
devastated the Confederate states. Price’s forces not only routinely 
looted Missouri citizens but murdered many in cold blood. Most of 
these actions were not borne of military necessity—certainly not the 
killings of civilians and prisoners of war. The Confederate Army 
of Missouri left in its wake a bloody trail of corpses and ransacked 
homes and businesses, hardly the benevolent liberating army of neo-
Confederate myth. Lause also harshly assesses the Federal com-
mander of the Department of Missouri, Major General William S. 
Rosecrans. According to Lause, Rosecrans was more concerned with 
protecting the business interests in Missouri than with protecting that 
state’s citizens from Price’s forces. Rosecrans also reacted with deplor-
able slowness to the threat, and did little to coordinate with the De-
partment of Kansas’s commander, Iowan Major General Samuel Ryan 
Curtis. 
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 Unfortunately, Lause ends Price’s Lost Campaign in mid-stride. The 
decision to use the word invasion in the subtitle is significant: Lause ar-
gues forcefully that the campaign was no raid, but that the intent was 
to “liberate” Missouri from Federal rule (2). That editorial decision 
influences the rest of the book, because Lause abruptly ends the study 
when the Confederates turned away from Jefferson City in early Oc-
tober 1864. His rationale is that when the Army of Missouri veered 
west from Jefferson City, it ceased to be an invasion and turned into a 
raid. From a military terminology standpoint, that is correct. However, 
this account may leave the reader unsatisfied because Lause ignores 
the fighting around Westport on October 21–23, 1864, as well as the pur-
suit after that battle—including the Battle of Mine Creek on October 
25. The Battle at Westport was the biggest battle of the Civil War in the 
trans-Mississippi, and the fight at Mine Creek was one of the largest 
cavalry battles of the war. The omission of those two clashes will there-
fore be a disappointment to readers who expect the study to examine 
the entire campaign.  
 Beyond this truncated account of the struggle, the lack of good 
maps is the book’s most significant shortcoming. Such maps are al-
most essential for readers to comprehend the swirl of events taking 
place throughout the campaign. 
 Despite these weaknesses, Price’s Lost Campaign is a significant ad-
dition to the historiography of the Civil War in the trans-Mississippi. 
The author strips away much of the myth surrounding Price’s inva-
sion with in-depth research and analysis. We can hope that Lause will 
follow up with a second volume examining the rest of the campaign in 
similar detail. If a showman is supposed to leave his audience wanting 
more, then Lause has succeeded admirably. 
 
 
Freedom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored Troops, 1862–1867, by William A. 
Dobak. Army Historical Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of 
Military History, 2011. xvi, 553 pp. Tables, maps, illustrations, notes, 
bibliography, index. $58.00 cloth, $38.00 paper.  
Reviewer Donald R. Shaffer teaches exclusively online for Upper Iowa Uni-
versity and other institutions. He is the author of After the Glory: The Struggles 
of Black Civil War Veterans (2004) and (with Elizabeth Regosin) Voices of Eman-
cipation: Understanding Slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction through the U.S. 
Pension Bureau Files (2008). 
Freedom by the Sword, by William A. Dobak, brings yet another per-
spective to the service of African Americans in the U.S. Civil War, 
Once a marginal topic, black Union soldiers have been the subject of 
